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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a 
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE 
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY 
RECREATION COMMUNITY, CONRAD H. 
KONING, and AMY J. KONING, 
Defendants-Respondents• 
Case No. 
Category 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby petition this Court, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1987) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42, to issue a 
writ directing the Court of Appeals to certify the decision and 
record in the above-entitled case to this Court for review. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals in conflict with 
prior decisions of this Court where the Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plain-
tiffs1 case, with prejudice, where plaintiffs' delays in prosecu-
tion of the case were justified under the circumstances, and 
defendants were equally at fault in contributing to the delay? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to hold that the 
trial court was required to consider whether less drastic sanc-
tions than dismissal would be appropriate? 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
reported at 740 P.2d 1368 and at 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. A copy of 
the slip opinion issued by the Court of Appeals is attached hereto 
as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on August 17, 
1987. On September 14, 1987, appellants sought and obtained an 
extension of time to file the within petition to September 30, 
1987. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-4 (1987), and the petition was timely filed pursuant to R. 
Utah S. Ct. 45. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for specific 
performance of the defendants' obligation to pave certain roads in 
a subdivision, and for damages, attorney's fees and other relief 
as authorized by the contract and by applicable statutes. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on June 15, 1981. The trial court 
purported to dismiss the case, sua sponte, by minute entry entered 
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on June 18, 1984. Defendants1 attorney did not prepare any order 
of dismissal nor was one signed at that time, but defendants1 
attorney filed a Notice of Withdrawal on or about June 25, 1984. 
The plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the dismissal on 
February 25, 1985. The matter was heard by the court on March 18, 
1985. The court denied the motion and entered an order on March 
27, 1985, formally dismissing the action with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The case was transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals heard oral arguments1 and an 
opinion affirming the dismissal was filed on August 17, 1987. 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on 
June 15, 1981, and subsequently filed a non-resident cost bond. 
Defendants answered the Complaint on July 6, 1981. On May 24, 
1982, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Deposition scheduling the 
deposition of defendants. (R. 15.) The deposition was later 
rescheduled for July 9, 1982. (R. 17.) On June 21, 1982, John B. 
Maycock entered an appearance as co-counsel for defendants (R. 
20), and on July 8 called plaintiffs' attorney and stated that 
defendants would not appear for their depositions. (Tr. page 2 
xJohn L. Miles, the attorney who represented plaintiffs 
before the trial court, prepared the briefs but withdrew as 
counsel prior to oral arguments. Plaintiffs were represented at 
oral arguments by the attorneys appearing herein. 
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line 19 to page 3 line 7.) Defendants later, on July 9 and July 
16, filed motions for protective orders to prevent the previously 
scheduled depositions. (R. 23-27.) Defendants1 original counsel, 
Scott Thorley, filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel on October 
26, 1982. (R. 28.) 
On April 4, 1983, plaintiffs filed interrogatories, but 
inadvertently served them only on Scott Thorley, who had 
previously withdrawn. (R. 34; Tr. page 3 lines 15-24.) Plain-
tiffs served the interrogatories on Mr. Maycock on March 22, 1984, 
shortly after discovering the error in service. (R. 39.) 
On December 5, 1983, the court issued a routine order 
directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and also scheduled the matter 
for a pre-trial hearing, both matters to be heard on March 19, 
1984. (R. 35-36.) Mr. Miles contacted Mr. Maycock concerning the 
pretrial and the outstanding interrogatories, and learned for the 
first time that Mr. Maycock had not received them. (Tr. page 3 
line 25 to page 4 line 4.) The parties stipulated that additional 
time was needed to complete discovery, and based on the stipula-
tion the hearing was continued to April 16, 1984 (R. 40-41; Tr. 
page 6 lines 1-7), and then continued for an additional 60 days. 
(R. 42.) A formal stipulation, giving defendants an additional 
thirty days to answer the prior interrogatories, and also stating 
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the neither party was ready for the case to be scheduled for 
trial, was filed on April 19, 1984. (R. 43-44.) 
On April 30, 1984, the court mailed a notice scheduling a 
trial in the case for June 18, 1984. (R. 35.) Plaintiffs1 
attorney contacted the trial court executive and informed her of 
the stipulation of the parties concerning the need for additional 
discovery (Tr. page 6, lines 10-14.) The matter was thereafter 
scheduled for a pre-trial on June 18, 1984. (R. 46.) 
A few days before the scheduled pre-trial, on either June 14 
or June 15, plaintiffs1 attorney discussed the scheduled pre-
trial with the trial judge and told him that the parties had 
stipulated that the case was not yet ready for trial, and also 
informed the judge that settlement negotiations where then pending 
and it appeared that the case may have been settled. The trial 
court informed plaintiffs' attorney that based on those represen-
tations there would be no need for him (plaintiffs1 attorney) to 
appear for the pre-trial scheduled for June 18. (Tr. page 6, line 
16 to page 7, line 4.) Plaintiff accordingly did not appear at 
the pre-trial, and the defendant also failed to appear. On that 
date, the court directed the filing of a Minute Entry purporting 
to dismiss the action with prejudice. (R. 48.) 
The Minute Entry purporting to dismiss the case was mailed to 
counsel, but no order of dismissal was prepared or signed. 
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Defendants' attorney filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel on 
June 25, 1984. (R. 50.) The Minute Entry purporting to dismiss 
the case did not come to the attention of plaintiffs' attorney, 
and he took no action on the case for a period of several months 
because he understood the case had been settled. (Tr. page 7, 
lines 13-20.) In January, 1985, plaintiffs contacted their 
attorney to determine what was happening with the case. Plain-
tiffs' attorney then discovered for the first time that the case 
had not been settled (Id.), and that the court had purported to 
dismiss the case. (Tr. page 8, lines 14-17.) 
Plaintiffs attempted to obtain a stipulation that the Minute 
Entry be set aside, and when those efforts failed plaintiffs filed 
a motion to set aside the dismissal. (Tr. page 8, line 18 to page 
9, line 7; R. 52-56.) The motion was heard by the court on March 
18, 1985, and the court denied the motion to set aside the 
dismissal and entered a formal order of dismissal. Plaintiffs 
thereafter perfected this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the trial court is given a 
considerable latitude of discretion in determining whether to 
dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, and that plaintiffs have 
the burden on appeal of showing an abuse of discretion. Depart-
ment of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 
1980). The discussion below establishes that such an abuse of 
discretion clearly occurred. No prior decision of this Court has 
affirmed a dismissal under circumstances equivalent to those in 
this case, and several decisions have reversed dismissals under 
more egregious circumstances. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals is a departure from prior decisions of this Court. This 
Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review 
that decision. 
Dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a harsh, 
extreme, and permanent sanction. See Bonneville Tower Con-
dominium Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, 
Inc. , 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986); Hildebrand v. Honeywell, 
Inc. , 622 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissal is an extreme 
sanction appropriate only where there has been willful contempt 
or contumacious conduct). Although the trial court is granted 
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discretion in the matter, the discretion is "not a mental 
discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to 
be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a 
manner to subserve, and not impede or defeat, the ends of 
substantial justice." Levee District No. 4 v. Small, 281 S.W.2d 
614 (Mo. App. 1955) (citation omitted) . 
While each case must be decided based on the totality of its 
own unique facts and circumstances, Department of Social Services 
v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980), this Court has 
enunciated the following basic factors to be considered: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward. 
3. What each of the parties have done to 
move the case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused to the other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice 
may result from the dismissal. 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977), citing 
Westinahouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Consideration of these factors must always be guided by the 
principle that "the very reason for the existence of courts is to 
afford disputants and opportunity to be heard . . . ." Id. Any 
doubts as to the propriety of dismissal must accordingly be 
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resolved in favor of allowing the matter to proceed to resolution 
on the merits. Id. 
Dismissal of the instant case was an abuse of discretion. 
First, the defendants contributed substantially to the delay, but 
the trial court failed to give any consideration to that factor. 
Second, the delays of the pretrial, which appear to have been the 
delays which were the motivating factor in the trial court's 
decision, were all stipulated to by the parties and excused by 
the trial court. Third, no prior decision of this court approves 
a dismissal under equivalent circumstances. Finally, the delay 
in bringing the motion to set aside the minute entry of dismissal 
was not justification for the extreme sanction of dismissal. 
These points will be addressed in order. 
A. The Lower Courts Abused Their Discretion in Failing to 
Give Proper Weight to the Failure of Defendants to Prosecute the 
Case. 
Several decisions of this Court establish that each party in 
a lawsuit has an obligation to take appropriate steps to move 
litigation along. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 
1369 (Utah 1977); Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975); Crystal Lime & 
Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624, 626 
(1959) . 
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The delays in this case were predominantly of two types: 
Delays resulting from the continuances of the pretrials and 
orders to show cause, and delays relating to discovery. Defen-
dants were equally to blame as were plaintiffs for both types of 
delays, if not more so. It is important that both parties failed 
to appear at each of the pretrials, not just the plaintiffs. The 
discovery delays consisted primarily of the plaintiff failing to 
seek sanctions for the defendants' delay in responding to 
interrogatories, and in failing to seek a ruling on defendants1 
attempt to avoid submission to depositions. 
In each of the decisions cited above, this Court held it was 
an abuse of discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute 
where the defendants were equally at fault in contributing to the 
delay. The Court of Appeals failed to follow those precedents. 
B. The Delays Relating to the Pretrial Conferences Were 
Each Excused by the Trial Court and Stipulated to by the Parties. 
A review of the record in this case compels the conclusion 
that the court dismissed the case because of its perception that 
the parties had ignored an order to attend a pretrial conference. 
The undisputed facts established, however, that each such failure 
was excused by the trial court. Three such conferences were 
scheduled. The first, scheduled for March 19, 1984, was con-
tinued to April 16, 1984, based on an oral stipulation of the 
parties that discovery was continuing and that the matter was not 
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yet ready for trial. This stipulation was communicated to the 
court by telephone on March 19 and approved by the trial court. 
The second pretrial, scheduled for April 16, 1984, was continued 
for the same reason as the first. A written stipulation which 
was the basis for the continuance was filed on April 19, 1984. 
A third pretrial, scheduled for June 18, 1984, was appar-
ently the precipitating cause of the dismissal. Neither party 
attended that pretrial, presumably because both parties under-
stood that the court had agreed to a continuance of the pretrial. 
It was undisputed that Mr. Miles had personally spoken with the 
trial court a few days before the hearing and explained the 
circumstances of the case, and that the trial court had stated 
that it would not be necessary for the parties to attend the 
pretrial. 
Although it would have been advisable for Mr. Miles to have 
confirmed in writing his agreement with the trial court, imposing 
the harsh and permanent sanction of a dismissal with prejudice 
for that failure is certainly an abuse of discretion. Clearly, 
an attorney has the right to rely upon a trial judge's direction 
and representation. No prior decision of this Court can be read 
as authorizing or condoning a dismissal under similar circum-
stances. 
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C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Conflicts with 
Prior Decisions of this Court. 
The Court of Appeals stated that dismissal of the instant 
case was justified by this Court's holding in Maxfield v. 
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), in which this Court by a 
three-two decision affirmed a dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
The facts of Maxfield are clearly distinguishable on the impor-
tant factors as outlined by other decisions of this Court. 
Although the total time in Maxfield from the filing of the 
complaint to dismissal was only approximately two years, the 
entire history of the case was characterized by total failure of 
the plaintiff to do anything to move the case forward and by 
diligent efforts by defendant to bring the case to trial. In 
addition, the plaintiff had ignored prior orders of the court 
without apparent excuse. The instant case is not at all similar. 
There is no evidence of any attempt in the instant case by 
defendants to move the case forward. Instead, defendants1 
efforts were those of delay and failure to timely respond. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs timely complied with all orders and 
directives of the trial court. 
Two other cases are illustrative of circumstances in which 
this Court has affirmed a dismissal with prejudice. In Grundmann 
v. Williams and Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984), the opinion 
reflects that there was absolutely no activity in the case for a 
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period of over four years. In Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 
Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973), there was a four and a half 
year period during which the plaintiff took no action of any 
kind. Neither of these cases is similar to the instant case. 
Cases in which this Court has reversed a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute equally compel the conclusion that the trial 
court and Court of Appeals abused their discretion in this case. 
For example, in Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1977), the complaint was filed on January 25, 1972, and only 
insignificant efforts and no discovery occurred from then until 
January 23, 1973. Thereafter absolutely no action was taken for 
a period of nearly four years. (The total life span of the 
instant case was four and a half years, and the longest single 
delay was ten and one-half months.) This Court stated: 
As to the lack of prosecution, it seems 
that neither party had any active interest in 
the matter for nearly four years. 
Since either party could have brought the 
matter to a conclusion it is difficult to see 
why the plaintiff should be denied his claim 
to more than $38,000 simply because counsel 
for plaintiff did not take a default judg-
ment. 
571 P.2d at 1369. This Court further distinguished and ques-
tioned its former decision in Maxfield, upon which the Court of 
Appeals in the instant case relied. 571 P.2d at 1370. Under the 
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facts in Firebrand, this Court held that it was an abuse of 
discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice.2 
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are less 
egregious than those in Firebrand. The Court of Appeals, without 
explaining its reasoning in any detail, asserted that Firebrand 
was distinguishable and instead relied on Maxfield, which this 
Court questioned in Firebrand. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals was clearly erroneous and in conflict with prior deci-
sions of this Court, and should be reversed. 
D. Plaintiffs1 Failure to Take Immediate Action to Set 
Aside the Minute Entry of Dismissal was Not Grounds for Dismissal 
with Prejudice. 
The only aspect of this case which might have warranted some 
sanction by the trial court was the approximately eight month 
time period between the trial court's minute entry purporting to 
dismiss the case and plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dis-
missal. Even that error, however, was justified under the 
circumstances, and was due in part to the defendants' failure to 
take appropriate action. 
2
 Other decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that 
dismissal of the instant case was an abuse of discretion. Utah 
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) (dismissal was abuse 
of discretion where both parties could have moved the case 
forward but failed to do so and delay was due in part to settle-
ment negotiations); Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977) 
(either party could have moved case forward). 
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The unsigned minute entry purporting to dismiss the case was 
clearly not a final order, and did not effect a dismissal of the 
case. Wisden v. Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Wilson v. 
Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982). Defendants had an obligation 
upon receipt of the minute entry to prepare an appropriate order 
and to submit it to plaintiffs for approval prior to submission 
to the court. Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 2.9. Such a proposed order 
would likely have evoked a response from plaintiffs. 
Mr. Miles' failure to take action after the entry of the 
minute entry, is not adequate justification for imposing the 
extreme sanction of dismissal on plaintiffs. Mr. Miles failed to 
take action because he thought the case had been settled, and 
because the minute entry never came to his attention. As 
established in Point II of this petition, the ultimate sanction 
of dismissal with prejudice is not appropriate where other lesser 
sanctions will serve the ends of justice. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER 
WHETHER LESSER SANCTIONS WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. 
Because the sanction of dismissal with prejudice is such a 
harsh penalty, several courts have held that the penalty "should 
be used quite sparingly and only when less drastic alternatives 
have been explored." Ramsay v. Bailey, 531 F.2d 706, 707 (5th 
15 
Cir. 1976) cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977) (citations omit-
ted) . Plaintiffs raised this argument before the Court of 
Appeals at oral argument, but the court apparently failed to 
consider the argument. 
Although the rule as expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court 
has not been adopted in those terms by this Court, it is in 
accordance with decisions of this Court which indicate that 
dismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy and should not be 
invoked except where necessary, Bonneville Tower Condominium 
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986), and that a dismissal should be 
reversed if it results in an injustice. Department of Social 
Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the trial court in this case should be 
required to consider whether lesser sanctions, such as dismissal 
without prejudice or imposing monetary sanctions against the 
parties or their attorneys or both, should be imposed prior to 
imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal. 
In the instant case, a dismissal without prejudice would 
have accomplished the trial court's purpose in clearing its 
calendar and clearly communicating to the parties its displeasure 
with the delays in the proceedings. This would have been 
especially appropriate because most of the delays were equally 
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the fault of defendants. Imposing the whole brunt of the 
sanction against plaintiffs with a dismissal with prejudice was 
an abuse of discretion, and the decision of the trial court and 
Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The delays in this case, while not to be condoned, do not 
warrant the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice. 
Defendants were equally at fault in contributing to or allowing 
the delays. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that 
dismissal is at variance with prior decisions of this Court, 
especially Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). 
In addition, the trial court and Court of Appeals failed to 
consider whether lesser sanctions would have been appropriate, 
and this Court should impose such a requirement. 
This Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of 
the Court of Appeals and the trial court should each be reversed, 
and this case remanded for resolution on the merits. In the 
alternative, this case should be remanded with instructions to 
17 
enter a dismissal without prejudice. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1987. 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
30th day of September, 1987. 
Russell J. Gallian 
Gallian, Drake & Westfall 
One South Main Street 
St. George, UT 84770 
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APPENDIX "A" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
' . j*: :-7 
Charlie Brown Construction 
Co., Inc., a Nevada Corporation, 
Charlie Brown and Carma Brown, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Leisure Sports Incorporated, 
a Nevada,Corporation, 
West Village Unit No. One, 
Mt. Holly Recreation Community, 
Conrad H. Koning, and Amy J. Koning, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Orme 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860119-CA 
BENCH, Judge: 
F I L E D 
AUG 171987 
T'mothyM Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district court denying 
their motion to set aside the dismissal of their complaint. We 
affirm. 
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners of certain lots 
at Mount Holly Ski Resort. Defendants are the developers of 
the area. On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against defendants to compel completion of certain road 
improvements. At defendants* request, plaintiffs posted a 
non-resident cost bond pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(j). 
Defendants then filed their answer on July 6, 1981. 
Ten and one-half months later, on May 
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint and a notice 
to take defendants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions. At 
defendants* request, the depositions were postponed to July 9, 
1982. On June 14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs1 motion to 
amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to appear and the 
motion was denied subject to renewal at a later date. On June 
21, 1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance as defendants* 
co-counsel. Subsequently, defendants* original counsel, Scott 
J. Thorley, withdrew. 
On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed motions for 
protective orders requesting their depositions not be taken. 
Defendants based their motions on protective orders issued in 
concurrent federal litigation. The court never ruled on the 
motions, nor did plaintiffs pursue their requested 
depositions. Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with the court 
on April 4, 1983, nine months after defendants' motions for 
protective orders. Plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly mailed a set 
of the interrogatories to Thorley, defendants' former counsel, 
who never forwarded the interrogatories to Maycock. 
On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of 
inactivity, the court sua sponte filed an order to show cause 
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
The court ordered both parties to appear on March 19, 1984. 
Failure to appear "[would] be considered as acquiescence to 
entry of an order of dismissal and the judgment [would] be 
entered by the Court without further notice to the parties." 
The court also filed a notice for a pre-trial hearing, also set 
for March 19, 1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the 
interrogatories and entered into a stipulation with defendants 
allowing defendants thirty more days to respond. The 
stipulation also gratuitously stated, "this matter should be 
stricken from the Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties 
have completed their discovery or until either party requests a 
Pre-Trial Conference." 
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs' counsel telephoned 
the trial court judge and informed him of the stipulation. The 
trial court excused the parties' absence and in a second order 
to show cause continued the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A 
transmittal letter, which referred to the telephone 
conversation and the stipulation, was filed on March 22. On 
April 16, 1984, the court again continued the matter for sixty 
days. A signed stipulation was filed on April 19, 1984. On 
April 30, 1984, the trial court sua sponte mailed notices to 
the parties setting trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs 
contacted the trial court executive and explained the 
stipulation. The trial court executive, rather than vacating 
the date, sent revised notices changing the trial setting to a 
pre-trial hearing. 
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to 
the trial court judge in St. George. Counsel explained the 
stipulation and informed the judge a settlement was likely. 
The court allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the 
June 18 hearing. However, when the matter was called on June 
18 and neither party was present, the judge ordered the case 
dismissed. In a minute entry, the court stated: 
This matter was called on hearing for a 
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared on 
behalf of either party. This matter had 
been set several times for pre-trial and 
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no one had ever appeared. The Court 
ordered the matter dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. The minute 
entry will serve as the Order of 
Dismissal. A copy is to be mailed to the 
respective parties. 
The court clerk mailed copies of the unsigned minute entry to 
both parties on June 28. 
Due to error, allegedly on the part of plaintiffs' 
counsel's secretary, the minute entry did not come to 
plaintiffs' counsel's attention until seven months later in 
January, 1985.1 When plaintiffs' counsel became aware of the 
minute entry, he attempted to consult with the trial court and 
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a motion on February 25 
to set aside the dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985, 
the court reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of 
counsel.2 The court, noting plaintiffs' failure diligently 
to prosecute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal and entered 
orders accordingly. 
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in 
denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal. 
Plaintiffs argue under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) the court has no 
authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute absent a motion 
by defendants. The rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff 
to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of court, 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him." The language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not 
requires, a motion by defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action for 
want of prosecution, the court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)], 
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end." See 
also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). Under 
the comparable federal rule, the United States Supreme Court 
similarly held: 
1. During this seven month period, Maycock filed a notice of 
withdrawal and defendants Konings, in reliance on the minute 
entry, sold their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc. 
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, arguing their counsel 
never had been authorized to enter into any stipulation to delay 
the action. The claim is of questionable relevance and is not a 
factor in our decision. 
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Neither the permissive language of the 
Rule—which merely authorizes a motion by 
the defendant—nor its policy requires us 
to conclude that it was the purpose of the 
Rule to abrogate the power of courts, 
acting on their own initiative, to clear 
their calendars of cases that have 
remained dormant because of the inaction 
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking 
relief. The authority of a court to 
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution 
has generally been considered an "inherent 
power/ governed not by rule or statute 
but by the control necessarily vested in 
courts to manage their own affairs so as 
to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases. 
Link v. Wabash R. Co.. 370 U. S. 626, 630-31 (1962). 
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amitv Mutual 
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985), "The burden 
is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without 
unusual or unreasonable delay." Plaintiffs are required "to 
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the 
penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 
1325 (Utah 1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. This 
Court will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly 
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there 
is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought. Department of 
Soc. Serv. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). 
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside 
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The court 
reviewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay after 
defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs' failure to attend 
the hearing on their motion to amend their complaint. The 
court reviewed plaintiffs* failure to pursue a ruling on 
defendants' motion for protective orders against the requested 
depositions. The court reviewed another ten month delay before 
plaintiffs pursued another discovery device, namely the 
interrogatories. The court also reviewed eight months more of 
delay before plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the 
interrogatories. Finally, and as noted by the court in its 
order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal, 
the court reviewed yet another eight months delay by plaintiffs 
from the time notification of the minute entry was received 
until they filed a motion to set aside the dismissal. 
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Plaintiffs argue the court erred in dismissing their action 
in light of the court's alleged excusal of both parties' 
appearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs contend the 
trial court was bound by the parties* prior stipulation to 
postpone any pre-trial conference which was communicated to and 
filed with the court. However, a trial court is not 
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which 
has not been incorporated in an order where the stipulation 
attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar. 
See Lake Meredith, 698 P.2d at 1346. 
Regardless of whether the trial court never knew of, 
ignored, or simply forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs 
themselves failed to comply with the intent of the 
stipulation. The primary purpose of the stipulation was to 
provide defendants an additional thirty days to respond to the 
interrogatories. When the thirty day period expired and no 
response had been received, plaintiffs did not move under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37 for an order compelling discovery nor attempt in 
any way to move the case forward. 
Plaintiffs do not claim the stipulation as an excuse for 
any of their numerous delays. Rather, plaintiffs* counsel 
asserts secretarial error as an excuse for the delay after 
receipt of the minute entry. Generally, law office delays or 
failures are unacceptable excuses for failure to prosecute. 
Valente v. First Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699, 
700 (Nev. 1974). 
Plaintiffs last argue the trial court erred in dismissing 
their action with prejudice and on the merits. Rule 41(b) 
states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits.** Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme Court cases which 
reversed a trial court's dismissal with prejudice as an abuse 
of discretion. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1977) (motion to dismiss filed at the same time as defendant's 
answer); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) 
(delay due to settlement negotiations); Crystal Lime & Cement 
Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (failure to 
consider counterclaims). These three cases are readily 
distinguishable. The facts of this case are much closer to 
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). In 
Maxfield, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable 
neglect in failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with 
reasonable diligence.- id. at 1324-25. In the instant case, 
the trial court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard 
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and to do justice*- Westinahouse Elec. SUPPIV Co, v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through 
dilatory conduct. 
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the 
dismissal. Costs to defendants. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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